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ABSTRACT
We examine the dynamic interaction of the population age structure, economic dependency, and
fertility, paying particular attention to the role of intergenerational transfers. In the short run, a
reduction in fertility produces a “demographic dividend” that allows for higher consumption.  In the
long run, however, higher old-age dependency can more than offset this effect. To analyze these
dynamics we develop a highly tractable continuous-time overlapping generations model in which
population is divided into three groups (young, working age, and old) and transitions between groups
take place in a probabilistic fashion. We show that most highly developed countries have fertility
below the rate that maximizes steady state consumption. Further, the dependency-minimizing
response to increased longevity is to raise fertility. In the face of the high taxes required to support
transfers to a growing aged population, we demonstrate that the actual response of fertility will likely














This paper examines the dynamic interaction of the population age structure, economic
dependency and fertility, paying particular attention to the role of intergenerational ﬁ-
nancial transfers. Our goal is to anaylze how changes in fertility aﬀect a country’s de-
mographic structure and how, via its eﬀect on the dependency burden faced by working
age adults, the age structure in turn aﬀects fertility. We develop a highly tractable
continuous-time overlapping generations model to analyze these dynamics. As will be
seen below, none of the pieces that constitute our model is new. However, the feedback
loop on which we focus is of great potential importance, and has so far not been studied
by economists.
The eﬀect of population age structure on economic outcomes is a widely studied topic.
For example, Cutler et al. (1990) and Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000) discuss the eﬀect
of population aging in the United States on feasible and optimal paths of consumption.
Because much of the transfer of resources to the elderly is channeled through governments,
population aging will have a particularly dramatic eﬀect on government ﬁnances (see
Lee and Edwards, 2001). Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001) similarly examine how a
“demographic dividend” resulting from reductions in fertility - that is, a period of several
decades in which the ratio of working age adults to dependent children and elderly is
unusually high - aﬀects overall economic growth in developing countries.
In the above literature, the important chain of causality is from the demographic to
the economic. That is, the underlying demographic inputs - most notably changes over
time in fertility - are either taken as exogenous or related to phenomena (such as declining
child mortality) that are outside the economic model being examined. In this paper we
close the circle, and concentrate our attenti o no nt h ei n t e r d e p e n dence of fertility and
population age structure, through the channel of economic dependency. Speciﬁcally, we
1look at how changes in fertility aﬀect population age structure and economic outcomes,
and how these feed back to aﬀect fertility.
A moment’s consideration suggests that the problem that we are interested in is
inherently dynamic. Changes in fertility have eﬀects on the population age structure that
take generations to play out. Most signiﬁcantly, while the immediate eﬀect of a decline
in fertility is a reduction in a society’s dependency burden, and so an expansion in the
feasible level of consumption, the long-run eﬀect of such a decline may be to actually
raise dependency and lower consumption. Fertility and age structure are thus linked in
a dynamical system. Such a system will have both steady states (in which fertility is
constant and the population age structure is stable) and a long lasting dynamic response
to external shocks.
Our interest in the mutual dependency of fertility and a society’s age structure is pri-
marily motivated by thinking about the future prospects of some of the most developed
countries in the world. Countries such as Italy and Japan are now coming to the end
of a decades-long period during which low fertility produced a transitorily low level of
population dependency. During the period 2010-2030, rapid population aging will dras-
tically impact consumption possibilities (and even more drastically impact government
budgets). The eﬀect of this consumption crunch on fertility - and thus on the age struc-
ture of the population even further down the road - is an issue that has not yet been
addressed by economists and demographers.1
The link between population age structure and fertility that we examine is not the
only such channel of causation. Most famously, Easterlin (1987) hypothesized that a
1Micevska and Zak (2002) examine fertility during income contractions that were even larger than
those projected to result from population aging: The Great Depression (in the United States and Ger-
many) and the transition from communism during the 1990s. In both cases, income declines produced
signiﬁcant reductions in total fertility. Micevska and Zak argue that such a phenomenon can be ex-
plained by a Malthusian model in which the perceived level of “subsistence” consumption is a function
of an individual’s own past consumption.
2cohort’s size was linked to its fertility through its eﬀect on the earnings of young adults
relative to those of their parents: members of a large cohort would ﬁnd themselves with
income that was low relative to the standard of living they had grown up with, and would
adjust fertility downward to partially restore their standard of living. The mechanism
that we examine here shares the feature of Easterlin’s model that reductions in living
standards trigger compensating reductions in fertility. However, our focus is on the ﬁscal
eﬀect of transfers to the elderly on after-tax earnings, rather than on the eﬀect of cohort
size on the pre-tax wage of young workers. For this reason, the key aspect of population
a g es t r u c t u r eo nw h i c hw ef o c u si st h er a t i oo fe l d e r l yd e p e n d e n t st ow o r k i n ga g ea d u l t s ,
rather than the ratio of older to younger workers on which Easterlin focuses. In principle
the two mechanisms could easily coexist.
In addition to identifying the feedback from population age structure to fertility
via the channel of dependency, a second contribution of this paper is to construct an
analytically tractable dynamic model of population age structure. Speciﬁcally, we build
a continuous time overlapping generations model in which population is divided into
three groups (young, working age, and old), and transitions between groups take place
in a probabilistic fashion àl aBlanchard (1985).2 Within this model, fertility can be
taken as exogenous or made an endogenous function of the population age structure.
The model is simple enough to be analyzed graphically, and yet captures the dynamic
adjustment of age structure, fertility, and consumption to external shocks such as changes
in old-age mortality, retirement age, or preferences regarding children. The model has
applications well beyond those pursued here, and also represents a new and convenient
way of conceptualizing demographic-economic interactions.
2Gertler (1999) extends Blanchard’s model in a fashion similar to ours, but only allows for two age
groups (working age and retired). Grafenhofer et al. (2005) present a model of probabilistic aging in
which there are eight age groups, which they use to quantitatively assess the eﬀects of population aging
on savings, consumption, and the tax rate. Both models take fertility as exogenous.
3The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we lay out our model of
the population age structure and develop the basic dynamic equations that will be used
in the subsequent analysis. Section 3 analyzes our model under the assumption that the
rate of fertility is exogenous. We also show how the model can be used to calculate the
rate of fertility that maximizes consumption in steady state and discuss the consumption-
maximizing response of fertility to increases in elderly dependency. In section 4 we allow
fertility to be an endogenous function of income, analyze the dynamics of the complete
system, and compare the actual and consumption-maximizing responses of the economy
to an exogenous shock to old-age mortality. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Dynamic Model of the Age Structure
Economists have long recognized the need to incorporate age heterogeneity into macro-
economic analysis. Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) developed simple economic-
demographic models in which agents with a ﬁnite life span progressed through a small
and discrete progression of ages. Overlapping generations (OLG) models of this type
have been used extensively in the economic growth literature. OLG growth models typi-
cally assume a two or three period lifecourse, which allows for a relatively clean analysis
of fertility and old-age dependency. However, periods within such model represent long
spans of time in the real world (e.g. 20-30 years). As a result, the dynamics generated
are lumpy, with jumps in rates and stocks occurring only between model periods. This is
satisfactory for an understanding of long-term transitions and equilibria. However, such
models do not allow changes in fertility and the population structure to be analyzed over
smaller time increments.
Adding more periods to a discrete time OLG model might allow for smoother dy-
namics, but adding more time periods implies adding more age groups. This increase in
4the state space implies diﬃculties in aggregation, making it more diﬃcult to cleanly an-
alyze macrostructural relationships. Under certain circumstance switching to continuous
time may simplify matters. A classic example is Blanchard’s (1985) “model of perpetual
youth.”3 We develop here a somewhat stylized continuous-time model that borrows from
both the traditional OLG framework and that of Blanchard. Given our interest in eco-
nomic dependency, rather than focus on the lifecycle as a series of ages, we instead model
it as a progression through a series of stages of economic life. Most individuals follow a
pattern whereby they are ﬁrst dependent on their parents, work for some amount of time,
and then retire. Accordingly, we divide the population into three groups: AY is the stock
of young people who have never worked; AM is the stock of people in the economy who
are in their working years; ﬁnally, AO is the stock of people who once worked, but are
now retired. The triple (AY,A M,A O) characterizes the age structure of the population.
Each individual i undergoes a monotone progression through the age structure. We
apply the Blanchard idea to this demo-economic progression by assuming constant exit
probabilities from each group Aj where j ∈ {Y,M,O}. For the young and working, λY
and λM give the hazard of transition to work and retirement, respectively. Among the
elderly, λO is the probability of dying. All of the ﬂows are determined by the structural
parameters, {λj},e x c e p tt h eﬂow of births into AY,w h i c hi sg i v e nb yN (t). The following
system of equations summarizes this model of the evolution of the age structure:
˙ AY (t)= N (t) − λYAY (t) (1)
˙ AM (t)=λYAY (t) − λMAM (t) (2)
˙ AO (t)=λMAM (t) − λOAO (t) . (3)
3In a more recent paper, Bommier and Lee (2000) develop a model of an economy with a continuous
age distribution, and are able to derive a number of interesting aggregate steady state results. However,
they make only limited progress in analyzing aggregate dynamics, and even these are made under the
assumption that the fertility rate is ﬁxed at its steady-state value.
5Table 1: Base Data for the OECD12
Country RT M TO
Australia 62.7 42.7 20.9
Belgium 60.6 40.6 21.2
Canada 63.6 43.6 20.0
France 59.7 39.7 22.9
Germany 62.8 42.8 19.2
Italy 61.6 41.6 25.4
Japan 63.8 43.8 20.4
Netherlands 62.5 42.1 19.1
Spain 63.2 43.2 19.7
Sweden 63.9 43.9 19.4
United Kingdom 62.3 42.3 19.5
United States 64.4 43.9 18.3
Average 62.6 42.6 20.5
Data Sources: OECD (2004, Table SS8) and United Nations
(2005, Tables 7 and 22).
We will use this system, under various assumptions regarding how fertility is determined,
to characterize the evolution of the age structure.4
The parameters λj give the inverse of the average time spent in each age group,
Tj. In referring to the number of members in Aj, we will use the term “size”, and when
discussing the average amount of time spent in group j,i.e. Tj we will call this the “width”
of Aj. The widths of the age groups can be used to ﬁt the model to demographic data.
4In our model we ignore childhood and early adult mortality, assuming that death only occurs among
the retired. The model could easily be adapted to incorporate these other forms of mortality by changing
the basic equations to:
˙ AY (t)=n(t)AM (t) − (λY + µY )AY (t) (˜ 1)
˙ AM (t)=λY AY (t) − (λM + µM)AM (t) (˜ 2)
˙ AO (t)=λMAM (t) − µOAO (t). (˜ 3)
With this set-up, λj is the transition probability to the next group, and the µj is the death rate in the
group. Analysis of this model would parallel that in the main text, with qualitatively similar results.
6Since our paper is geared toward describing issues aﬀecting the highly-developed world,
we focus our attention to 12 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (the “OECD12”).5 S i n c ed a t ao nt h ea g eo fe n t r yi n t ot h el a b o rf o r c e
(TY)a r ed i ﬃcult to come by, we assume that age 20 is a reasonable number. We set
TM = R−20, where R is the average age of retirement and for OECD12 member nations is
available from OECD (2004, Table SS8.1).6 The United Nations (2005, Table 22) provides
data on life expectancy in ﬁve-year increments. Since the decline in life expectancy is
roughly linear between ages 55 and 75, we compute life expectancy at retirement (TO)
through linear interpolation of life expectancies at the surrounding ﬁve-year increments.7
Table 1 presents the basic data (R,TM,T O) for the OECD12. As can be seen in the table,
life expectancy after retirement is substantial. The proportion of life spent as an elderly
dependent ranges from 0.22 in the United States to almost 0.3 in Italy.
2.1 Production and Dependency
In order to focus our attention on the dynamics of the age structure, we assume that
output is produced solely by labor, which is supplied inelastically by people in their
working years. The total pool of resources available for consumption is
Ω(t)=W (t)AM (t) ,
5These countries are selected so that they are among the top twenty in both GDP per capita and
population among the OECD nations. The members of our OECD12 are: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
6The measure of R is the average of the oﬃcial and eﬀective retirement ages, the latter of which is
based on “observed changes in participation rates over a 5-year period for successive cohorts of workers
(by 5-year age groups) aged 40 and over” (OECD 2004, notes accompanying Table SS8.1).
7Since our model does not account for sex diﬀerences, we compute R and TO as the gender-weighted
average of the retirement age and life expectancy values for each sex. Population weights are from United
Nations (2005, Table 7).
7where W (t) is the prevailing wage at time t. The young and the elderly are supported









In the remainder of this section we establish various properties of the equations governing
the evolution of the old-age and youth dependency ratios. These will serve as the basis
for our subsequent analysis of dynamic equilibrium.
2.1.1 The old-age dependency ratio
The equation of motion for the old-age dependency ratio can be derived from (2) and (3)
as
˙ o(t)=λM − (λO − λM)o(t) − λYy(t)o(t) . (5)
The dynamics of o(t) in (y,o)-space are relatively straightforward, and we present some
basic results here that are applicable throughout the paper.




≡ Zo (y(t)) . (6)
Hence, for a given value of the youth dependency ratio, there is exactly one equilibrium
value of o. Considering the graphical properties of the Zo (y) in (y,o)-space, the vertical
intercept is given by λM/(λO − λM) > 0. That the intercept is positive follows from
the fact that the expected time in retirement is less than the expected time working.
Thus, since TO <T M,w eh a v et h a tλO >λ M. Because Z0
o (y) < 0 and Z00
o (y) > 0,
the zero motion locus for is downward sloping and convex with respect to the origin.
8Finally, noting that d[˙ o(t)]/d[o(t)] < 0, all equilibrium values of o are stable. That is,
for a given value of the youth dependency ratio, the old-age dependency ratio steadily
converges to the corresponding point on the zero motion locus.
2.1.2 Fertility and the youth dependency ratio
The dynamics of the youth dependency ratio requires depend on the ﬂow of births, which
is a function of the stock of fertile persons and the rate of fertility among the fertile. We
give here a fairly general dynamic equation for the youth dependency ratio, laying out
a basic assumption regarding the stock of fertile of persons. In later sections we specify
t h er a t eo ff e r t i l i t ya m o n gt h ef e r t i l ei ng r e a t e rd e t a i l .




− (λY − λM)y(t) − λY [y(t)]
2 . (7)
For simplicity, we assume that the fertile population is a ﬁxed proportion, φ,o ft h ew o r k -
force. Since all members of the workforce are homogenous in our model, an alternative
interpretation of φ is to decompose it as φ = TF/TM,w h e r eTF <T M is the expected
length of time spent fertile among each member of M.8 Letting n(t) represent the average
fertility rate at time t among the fertile, under this assumption (7) reduces to
˙ y(t)=φn(t) − (λY − λM)y(t) − λY [y(t)]
2 . (8)
We will refer to φn(t) as the ﬂow of births per worker.
The equation of motion for the youth dependency ratio (8) does not depend explicitly
8An additional set of equations, consistent with those governing the economic age structure, could
be speciﬁed to allow φ to vary over time. However, doing so makes analyzing the model substantially
more complicated, while adding very little qualitatively to our analysis.
9on o(t). Thus, if fertility is determined in a manner unrelated to the old-age dependency
ratio, equilibrium analysis of the relative economic age structure is straightforward. This
is the case in Sections 3 where we take the fertility rate as given. In Section 4 we allow
fertility to be endogenously determined. Since fertility will be a function of after-tax
income, transfers to the elderly through the pension system cause the old-age dependency
ratio to play a role in the dynamics of the youth dependency ratio.
3 Fertility and Economic Dependency
In this section we analyze our model assuming that the fertility rate is ﬁxed and ex-
ogenous. (That is, n(t)=n for all t.) We focus on the relationship between fertility,
old-age mortality and a measure of total dependency in the economy. The traditional
demographic measure of total dependency is simply the sum of youth dependency, y,a n d
old-age dependency, o. However, as pointed out by Cutler et al. (1990), the consumption
requirements of the young and the elderly are not necessarily the same. This implies
that an increase in youth dependency will not generally have the same implications for
resource availability as an increase in old-age dependency. Consequently, we focus on a
measure of needs-weighted economic dependency, e(t). In particular we assume that the
children and elderly have consumption needs equivalent to ρY and ρO times that of the
working, which implies that economic dependency at a given moment is
e(t)=ρYy(t)+ρOo(t) . (9)
Given our labor-based production structure, we assume further, as in Weil (1999), that
the consumption of the all three groups is indexed to the wage. That is cY (t)=ρYcM (t),
10cO = ρOcM (t),a n dcM (t)=η(t)W (t). Given the aggregate resource constraint,
cY (t)AY (t)+cM (t)AM (t)+cO (t)AO (t)=Ω(t) ,





The index η aﬀects the consumption of all groups proportionately. In the parlance of
Cutler et al., η is the “support ratio,” that is, the ratio of the production capacity of
the economy to the consumption needs of the population. Increases in youth and elderly
dependency reduce the per-capita resources in the economy, but their eﬀects on η are
proportional to the relative consumption needs of the young and old. Below we consider
the impact of changes in the fertility rate on economic dependency and consumption. We
then consider the consequences population aging due to increased life-expectancy among
the elderly. Before proceeding we characterize the basic equilibrium of in our model,
given constant rate of fertility.
3.1 Equilibrium with Exogenous Fertility
With a ﬁxed fertility rate, the equation of motion for the youth dependency ratio is
˙ y(t)=φn − (λY − λM)y(t) − λY [y(t)]
2 . (11)
Since the dynamic equation does not depend on o(t), (11) can simply be examined for
equilibrium values of the youth dependency ratio. Setting ˙ y(t) equal to zero yields one
positive root, denoted by ¯ y. Writing this in terms of the widths of the age groups (Tj),






rather than the exit parameters (λj),





















The equation of motion for y implies that this root is stable. The corresponding equilib-
rium old-age dependency ratio is given by
¯ o = Zo (¯ y)=
1
(TM/TO − 1) + (TM/TY)¯ y
. (13)
Graphically, Figure 1 portrays the global dynamics of the population dependency ratios.
The equilibrium point is globally stable and the population dependency ratios converge
monotonically to the point (¯ y,¯ o).
12It is convenient to consider the ﬂow of births per worker in terms of the gross reproduc-
tive rate (GRR), a fertility concept commonly used by demographers. Since individuals
in our model are the reproductive unit of analysis, the GRR is the number of children an
individual can expect to have, assuming that they are subject to the currently-prevailing
rate of fertility for the entirety of their childbearing years. Given our assumptions re-
garding the stock of fertile persons, this implies that the gross reproductive rate is simply





Note that when G equals one, the population of workers is just replacing itself. Sub-
stituting in (14) for the ﬂow of births, the equilibrium youth dependency ratio can be
rewritten in terms of the GRR:





















When the GRR is at the replacement rate the equilibrium dependency ratios simplify to
¯ yr = TY/TM,a n d¯ or = TO/TM. These results are fairly intuitive, and parallel those in
basic demographic theory. In a stable population with replacement fertility, the relative
sizes of the age groups in equilibrium should simply be the ratios of their widths.
3.2 Declining Fertility and the Consequences for Consumption
Much of the twentieth century was characterized by declines in period fertility rates,
with the exception of the post-World War II baby boom. Considering the implications
for the population dependency ratios, given a fall in G, equation (15) implies that the
equilibrium youth dependency ratio falls. As shown in Figure 2, the decline in ¯ y maps
to a higher equilibrium value of the old-age dependency ratio along the Zo (y) locus.
13Considering the transition to an equilibrium with lower fertility, initially the declines
in youth dependency are larger than the increases in old-age dependency, so that economic
dependency (e) declines. This leads to an increase in the consumption index η,r e ﬂecting
the “demographic dividend” discussed by Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001). Later
in the transition, there comes a turning point where the declines in e caused by y are
more than oﬀset by the increases in e, in which case η begins to increase as the economy
approaches the new equilibrium.9 Hence, the consumption beneﬁts from the demographic
dividend are time-limited. The net eﬀect of a fertility decline on equilibrium economic
dependency is ap r i o r iambiguous. The inset of Figure 2 shows a possible set of paths
for y, o,a n dη after a decline in the fertility rate in the case where the new equilibrium
has a higher level of economic dependency (and a lower level of consumption) than the
original equilibrium. As we will see, this likely represents the eﬀects of further fertility
declines in most of the highly developed world.
Following Weil (1999), given a certain value of economic dependency, ˜ e,w ec a nu s e







y ≡ I˜ e (y) (16)
Since changes in fertility trace out equilibrium population dependency ratios along Zo (y),
we may consider the relationship between the iso-dependency lines and this locus. Iso-
dependency lines that are closer to the origin are associated with a lower rate of economic
dependency and a higher consumption index, η. Because Zo (y) is convex with respect
to the origin, there is a unique equilibrium pair (¯ ym, ¯ om) that is tangent to the Zo (y)
locus. (See Figure 3.) The pair (¯ ym, ¯ om) minimizes economic dependency, which implies
9The initial decline in e should be evident from an analysis of the phase diagram. While o is still
close to the Zo (y) locus, y is very far from its steady state. Our assertion of a turning point makes
intuitive sense, and can be established based on numerical simulations of the model using parameter
values describing the OECD12 nations.
14Figure 2: The Eﬀects of a Decline in the Fertility Rate
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that consumption of all members of the economy is maximized. At this point, the slope
of the Zo(y) locus must equal the slope of the iso-dependency line, which based on (13),


















Given that ¯ o is a monotonically negative function of G, there is a unique fertility rate,
Gm, that generates this equilibrium, given values of the other parameters. At equilibria
corresponding to higher fertility rates, i.e. those in Region A of the Zo (y) locus in Figure
3, small declines in G are associated with lower equilibrium economic dependency and
higher consumption. The opposite occurs in Region B, which is associated with lower
fertility rates.
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For a country with a fertility rate Gh >G m (i.e. in Region A), as the fertility rate
declines toward the consumption-maximizing rate, consumption increases at all future
times, assuming that the other parameters remain stable. On the other hand, for a
country with a fertility rate below the consumption-maximizing rate the transition to Gm
is costly. As shown in Figure 4, in a country with the same initial economic dependency
as implied by Gh and a fertility rate of G  <G m, economic dependency must initially
increase, implying a reduction in η. It is only later in the transition, as the elderly
dependency ratio declines, that the consumption beneﬁts from the increase in fertility
are realized.
Given a set of widths of the age groups and relative consumption needs, ascertaining
whether an economy is in Region A amounts to checking whether the observed fertility
rate (Ga) is at or above the consumption-maximizing fertility rate. We undertake this
16Figure 4: Transition to Consumption-Maximizing Equilibrium from Above and Below
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calculation for the OECD12 nations. Based on measures of education, health and private
consumption expenditures, Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000) estimate that ρY =0 .62 and
ρO =1 .37 in the United States.10 It seems reasonable that ρY and ρO should follow
a similar pattern in the other highly-developed nations. Taking the values of ρY and
ρO from Elmendorf and Sheiner, and using the base data on age widths from Table 1,
we compute Gm for the OECD12 nations based on equation (17). In the ﬁrst column
of Table 2, we report the actual gross reproductive rate and in the second we give our
calculation of Gm. In eleven out of the twelve nations, the current GRR is less than the
consumption-maximizing fertility rate, and for most the diﬀerence is quite substantial. It
is only in the United States that the currently-observed fertility rate exceeds Gm.11 Hence,
10These update the estimates of the relative consumption needs given by Cutler et al. (1990).
11That the consumption-maximizing rate is so low in the U.S. is largely a function of the relatively
short life expectancy after retirement. Similarly, Gm is the highest in Italy where life expectancy after
retirement is the longest. We discuss the relationship between Gm and life expectancy more explicitly
below.
17Table 2: Actual and Consumption-Maximizing Gross Reproductive Rates and Potential
Consumption Gains for the OECD12
Country Ga Gm Potential gain in η (%)
Australia 0.88 1.19 0.41
Belgium 0.83 1.33 1.36
Canada 0.76 1.03 0.40
France 0.94 1.61 1.53
Germany 0.66 0.91 0.49
Italy 0.64 1.88 6.58
Japan 0.67 1.07 0.25
Netherlands 0.86 0.91 0.05
Spain 0.64 0.98 0.74
Sweden 0.82 0.91 0.06
United Kingdom 0.83 1.00 0.11
United States 1.02 0.72 0.26
Average 0.80 1.13 1.02
Notes: Ga is from United Nations (forthcoming); Gm and the percentage
gain in the consumption index, η, are calculated as described in the text.
based on present demographic data, the equilibria for most highly-developed economies
fall in Region B of the Zo (y) locus. This suggests that recent declines in fertility will
ultimately be associated with higher equilibrium rates of economic dependency and lower
levels of consumption. Conversely, equilibrium consumption could be increased in most
countries through increases in the fertility rate.
In order to determine the equilibrium beneﬁts from moving to the consumption-
maximizing rate of fertility, we use equations (13) and (15) to calculate the steady-state
population dependency ratios for the OECD12 consistent with the age widths in Table
1 and the values of Ga and Gm reported in Table 2. Weighting these by the relative
consumption needs gives us the equilibrium level of economic dependency associated
with the actual fertility rate and with the consumption-maximizing fertility rate. We
18denote these as ¯ ea and ¯ em, respectively. Finally, equation (10) allows us to compute the
per-capita consumption index η associated with these two values. The third column of
Table 2 reports the percentage increase in η(¯ em) relative to η(¯ ea). The average potential
steady-state consumption gain in the OECD12 is approximately one percent. Countries
with fertility rates furthest away from their respective values of Gm obviously have the
most to gain. For example, if the fertility rate in Italy were to rise to its consumption-
maximizing rate, the steady-state per-capita consumption index would rise by almost 6.6
percent. However, since most of the countries under consideration have fertility rates
below their consumption-maximizing rate, the transition to Gm would entail a transitory
period of higher economic dependency and lower consumption.
A number of explanations have been proposed for the currently low levels of fertility
in the most-developed nations, which we have so far taken as given.12 Nonetheless,
the future path of fertility in these “lowest-low fertility” countries is a matter of some
debate among demographers, and there is limited theory to guide predictions. At the
same time, it is almost a certainty that old-age mortality will decline in the future. In
Section 3.3, we explore the consequences of falling mortality among the elderly in terms
of economic dependency and consumption, and in Section 4 we consider a mechanism
whereby increased life expectancy itself may aﬀect the path of fertility.
3.3 The Eﬀects of Falling Old-Age Mortality
Old-age mortality has fallen substantially over the past ﬁfty years, and is expected to
decline further in the future. In the United States, for example, life expectancy at age
65 has risen by 3.25 years since 1955 and is expected to rise by approximately the same
amount over the next 50 years.13 Other highly-developed countries have seen comparable
12See, e.g. Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2002).
13Here we use the simple, rather than gender-weighted, average of sex-speciﬁc life-expectancies. The
data on period life expectancies and come from the Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors
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or greater reductions in old-age mortality over the past half-century and can be expected
to follow a similar trend in the future.14 Assuming a constant rate of fertility and constant
values of the other parameters, Figure 5 demonstrates the eﬀects of an increase in life
expectancy among the elderly in the context of our model. As life expectancy rises from
T1
O to T2
O,t h eZo (y) locus shifts upward, leaving youth dependency unchanged. The
old-age dependency ratio increases monotonically toward the new equilibrium, while the
consumption index η declines due to the higher burden of elderly dependency.
The consumption-maximizing fertility rate is a function of the life expectancy of the
elderly, as described in equation (17). Ceteris paribus, as life expectancy rises so does Gm
because the total cost of support per elderly dependent rises. While an increase in fertility
Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (2005, Table V.A3). For the projected gain in life
expectancy, we use the “intermediate” variant. Other independent mortality projections (e.g. Lee and
Carter 1992) predict even higher values of life expectancy.
14See, e.g., Munnell, Hatch and Lee (2004).
20Figure 6: The Eﬀects of a Decline in Old-age Mortality on the Consumption-Maximizing
Equilibrium
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would cause y to rise in equilibrium, the reduction in η due to higher youth dependency
is more than oﬀset by the eventual decrease in the more consumption-intensive elderly
dependency. For countries that initially have a fertility rate higher than Gm (such as
Gh in Figure 6), the consumption-maximizing rate draws closer to their existing fertility
r a t e .A ss e e ni nt h eﬁgure, not only does the best-attainable level of consumption fall,
so does the potential equilibrium gain from reducing the fertility rate.15 For countries
with a fertility rate lower than Gm (e.g. G  in Figure 6), the consumption-maximizing
fertility rate moves further away as old-age mortality falls. Although the best-attainable
level of consumption falls, the potential equilibrium gains from a higher fertility rate are
greater.
15This can be established analytically since the Zo (y) locus gets steeper for any value of y as TO
increases.
21Repeating the numerical calculation from Section 3 for all OECD12 under the assump-
tions that TO increases by 3.25 years and that actual fertility rates remain unchanged
results in an average potential increase in η of just over 3 percent. Further, the United
States joins the eleven other nations in having a fertility rate below the consumption-
maximizing rate. As we will see below, the burden of old-age dependency itself may
cause fertility rates to decline (rather than rise), leading to long-run outcomes that are
even less eﬃcient from a consumption standpoint.
4 Old-Age Dependency and Fertility
In our analysis of economic dependency and consumption thus far, we have taken the
fertility rate as exogenous. This ignores the vast economics literature that regards fertil-
ity, for the most part, as the result of a decision making by potential parents who weigh
the costs and beneﬁts of having children. Hence, in addition to diﬀerences in consump-
tion needs, there is a more profound asymmetry between youth dependency and elderly
dependency. The economic burden of youth dependency is partially the result of the fer-
tility choices of the working. On the other hand, adults have no choice over the number
of elderly persons in the economy, but are typically required to support them through
public pension systems. In a pay-as-you-go pension system, rising elderly dependency re-
duces the per-capita resources available to the working. Given standard economic models
of child-bearing decisions, this potentially provides a partial explanation for declines in
the fertility rate over the last half-century. Drucker (1990, p.7) takes a stronger stand on
this issue, arguing that the primary cause of low and declining fertility in the developed
world is that “its younger people are no longer able to bear the increasing burden of
supporting a growing population of older, nonworking people.”
Boldrin et al. (2005) provide some empirical evidence in support of this idea, em-
22ploying a panel sample from 1960 to the present for eight Western European countries.
Controlling for measures of the generosity of the pension system and infant morality,
they ﬁnd a strong and negative relationship between fertility and the share of the pop-
ulation 65 and over (p65). In the eight countries in their sample the average increase in
p65 between 1960 and 2000 was approximately 4.7 percentage points.16 Applying their
regression coeﬃcient to this diﬀerence implies a predicted decline of 0.15 in the GRR,
which was over a quarter of the average actual reduction in the GRR in the sample. Thus,
increases in elderly dependency potentially explain a good deal of the recent declines in
fertility.
We develop here an extension to our basic model that allows this sort of dynamic
interaction between old-age dependency, fertility and the age structure. We retain the
production structure described above, where workers provide labor inelastically in return
for a wage of W (t). Wages are subject to a proportional tax τ, which is used to fund
public transfers to the old and to the young. We assume that the elderly are supported
entirely through public transfers in the form of a pension system, while the young receive
both public support and direct transfers from their parents. Although somewhat stylized,
this distinction mirrors the substantial diﬀerence in the pattern of transfers to the old and
young observed in reality. According to Mason et al. (2005), private transfers account
for over 61% of the transfer-based consumption of persons under the age of 20 in the
United States, but only 11% of the total transfers to persons over the age of 65.
The pension system replaces after-tax wages at a rate β, and we assume that per-
capita public transfers to the young are equal to a ﬁxed proportion, π, of the net transfers
16Our data on the share of the population age 65+ and fertility rates drawn from United Nations
(2000 and forthcoming).
23to the elderly. The tax rate at time t is determined by the aggregate resource equation
AYαW (t)(1− τ (t)) + AM (t)W (t)(1− τ (t)) + AOβW (t)(1− τ (t)) = Ω(t) , (18)





Higher rates of youth and old-age dependency both increase the tax rate. As a result,
increases in both forms of dependency decrease the take-home pay of the workers and
the size of per-capita public transfers to the youth and elderly. Given values of α and
β, we can solve for the tax-rate minimizing gross reproductive rate, Gm
τ . Similar to the
analysis in Section 3, Gm



















Because of the large share of the consumption of children that is privately funded, (α/β)
will be substantially less than (ρY/ρO), which plays a corresponding role in equation
(17). Since ¯ o is a negative function of G, this will imply that the tax-rate minimizing
rate of fertility is substantially higher than that which maximizes consumption in the
framework of Section 3. We do not attempt to quantify Gm
τ , focusing instead on the
divergence between the privately chosen rate of fertility and the tax-minimizing rate.
At each moment in time the fertile population of workers allocate their after-tax
income to their own consumption and to bearing children. The price of goods and
services is numeraire. The nature of our model of the age structure makes it diﬃcult to
link children to their parents, so we assume that childrearing expenses are paid up front
24into a trust fund. Further, the consumption needs of children at any given moment are
indexed to the prevailing wage, equalling χW. This implies that, conditional on a given
level of fertility and a tax rate (i.e., age structure), the consumption of the parents will
also be multiple of the pre-tax wage.17 With a constant rate of wage growth, g, to ensure
that children always receive the requisite consumption, an actuarially-neutral trust fund
will set the price of children as
pn = ξW (t) ,
where ξ = χTY/(1 − gTY).18




ln[c(t)] + θln[n(t)] (20)
subject to
c(t)+ξW (t)n(t)=w(t), (21)
where c(t) is the consumption, n(t) is the annual ﬂow of births per fertile worker, and









where ψ = θ/(ξ(1 + θ)). The ﬂow of births per fertile worker satisﬁes some usual prop-
erties: fertility is a positive function of the relative preference for children (θ)a n da
17The consumption requirement of children could be directly indexed to that of the parents, and we
could also include a time cost of children. Incorporating these would yield qualitatively similar results
to the model we present, so we ignore them for ease of exposition.
18For the path of trust fund payments to remain bounded, g must be less than 1/TY .T a k i n g2 5y e a r s
as an upper limit on the average length of youth dependency, this implies that g must be less than 4%
over the long run, which is quite reasonable.
25negative function of childrearing costs (ξ).
The privately-optimal fertility rate is ineﬃcient relative to the that which would be
chosen by a social planner whose goal is to maximize the equilibrium utility of fertile
workers. To see this, consider the optimization problem of the social planner who takes
into account the both the utility that fertile workers get from fertility and consumption
as well as the eﬀects of fertility decisions on the dependency ratios. Substituting in the







1+αy (ˆ n)+β (ˆ n)
− ξˆ n
¸
+ θln[ˆ n] . (23)
The ﬁrst order condition for (23) can be written
ˆ n =˜ n(ˆ n)+
1
ξ (1 + θ)
[−αy0 (ˆ n) − βo0 (ˆ n)] ˆ n
(1 + αy(ˆ n)+βo(ˆ n))
2 , (24)
where ˜ n(ˆ n) is the fertility rate that workers would chose, conditional on the equilibrium
(o(ˆ n),y(ˆ n)). Based on the equilibrium equations (12) and (13), the term in brackets on
t h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 2 4 )i se q u a lt o
[−αy
0 (ˆ n) − βo
0 (ˆ n)] =
£




0 (ˆ n) .
Since y0 (·) is negative, the social planner’s chosen fertility rate, ˆ n, is higher than the
worker’s private choice based on the age structure implied by ˆ n when
β [o(ˆ n)]
2 (TM/TY) − α<0,
and is lower otherwise. Consequently, ˆ n equals ˜ n(ˆ n) only when (19) holds, which implies
that ˆ n = nm
τ . That is, a social planner optimizing the fertile workers’ equilibrium utility
26would set the fertility rate equal to that which minimizes the tax rate. As old-age
mortality declines, there will be a greater divergence between privately-chosen fertility
rates and the tax-minimizing rate.
The dynamic analysis of Section 3 can easily be augmented to analyze the eﬀects of
increased life expectancy among the elderly. Due to a standard income eﬀect, changes in
o aﬀect fertility through the tax rate. As a result, the dynamics of the youth dependency
ratio will be aﬀected by the old-age dependency ratio. Putting the ﬂow of births per
fertile worker, ˜ n, into the equation of motion of the youth dependency ratio (equation






(1 − TY/TM)y + y2 − (1 + αy)
¸
≡ Zy (y) .
This locus represents equilibrium values of y t h a ta r es t a b l e( b e c a u s ed˙ y/dy < 0). Fur-
ther, it is downward sloping and convex with respect to the origin, asymptotes to inﬁnity
as y approaches zero, and crosses the horizontal axis for large enough values of y. Finally,
there is a single crossing in the positive orthant between the Zy (y) and Zo (y) loci, which
implies that a globally stable equilibrium in the population dependency ratios, depicted
in Figure 7.19
We depict the transition associated with a fall in mortality in this model of endoge-
nous fertility in Figure 8. As discussed above, lower rates of old-age mortality translate
directly into increases in the rate of elderly dependency due to longer life expectancy
after retirement. If fertility rate were to remain unchanged, old-age dependency would
rise from ¯ o1 to o0, and the youth dependency ratio would remain constant at ¯ y1. However,
increases in old-age dependency drive up the tax rate in our model, given the govern-
ment’s balanced budget constraint. Since workers will have less disposable income, the
19A proof of the single crossing between the loci is available upon request.






























28rate of childbirth among the fertile will fall. We have already shown in Section 3 that
declines in fertility lead, ceteris paribus, to increases in old-age dependency. As a result,
there is a multiplier eﬀect on declines in old-age mortality, whereby increases in old-age
dependency reduce fertility, which further increase old-age dependency. However, as the
fertility rate falls, so does the youth dependency ratio. The consequent reductions in
public expenditures on the young acts as a brake on the feedback cycle between rising
old-age dependency and falling fertility. Nonetheless, the net result is a transition to an
equilibrium with an old-age dependency ratio ¯ o2 that is even higher than o0. Further the
ratio of young to working falls from ¯ y1 to ¯ y2 due to the declines in fertility induced by
the rise in elderly dependency.
As life expectancy among the elderly rises, the tax-minimizing fertility rate (nm
τ ≡
Gm
τ /φ) will increase due to the mechanism discussed in Section 3.3. However, the response
of the fertile workers to an increase in life expectancy is to reduce their fertility. As a
result, in the highly developed countries where ˜ n is initially less than nm
τ , the privately-
optimal fertility response of workers to a decrease in old-age mortality ends up reducing
the well-being of future workers as well as decreasing the pool of resources available to
all of the other individuals in the economy.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have analyzed the dynamic evolution of a country’s population age
structure and fertility rate. Our particular concern was with the feedback from population
age structure to fertility via the channel of old age dependency. In a country with a high
level of old-age dependency, working age individuals will see a large fraction of their
labor income redistributed to the elderly. In response, working age individuals will lower
fertility.
29The dynamic aspects of the problem that we study are particularly important because
the short and long-run eﬀects of changes in fertility on dependency are so diﬀerent. In the
short run, a reduction in fertility unambiguously lowers a society’s dependency burden
by reducing the number of children relative to working age adults. In the long run,
reductions in fertility raise a country’s of old age dependency ratio, potentially undoing
the reduction in youth dependency. Our calculations indicate that developed nations with
the lowest levels of fertility have already passed the point where reductions in fertility
raise rather than lower the long-run dependency burden.
To conduct our analysis we constructed a new continuous-time overlapping genera-
tions model that divides the population into three age groups: dependent young, working
age, and dependent elderly. Individuals in each age group face constant hazards of tran-
sitioning into the next group (or into death, in the case of the elderly). The model
allows us to examine the dynamic evolution of age structure of the population and the
consumption dependency burden in response to changes in fertility (in the case where
fertility is exogenous) or the joint evolution of fertility, age structure and dependency to
exogenous shocks such as old age mortality.
Using our model, we show that for countries that are already below the level of fertility
that maximizes consumption in the steady state, the actual and optimal responses of
fertility to a shock to old-age survival have opposite signs. In response to greater old age
survival, such countries will eﬀectively dig themselves into a deeper demographic hole by
cutting fertility in order to maintain consumption in the short run.
The model that we present is somewhat stylized in the interests of analytic tractability
and ease of exposition. It could be extended along two major dimensions in order to
improve its realism and forecast accuracy. First, it would be useful to expand the number
of age groups beyond the three basic ones we use. Moving beyond three age groups would
30mean that the dynamics of the model could not be examined analytically, however,
and we would be forced to take a computational approach along the lines of Auerbach
and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) and Grafenhofer et al. (2005). Second, the model could also be
extended to incorporate intertemporal optimization on the part of households, which
would entail shifting consumption between periods in response to anticipated changes in
demographics. Such intertemporal shifting, either through investment in physical capital
or purchase of foreign assets, could allow agents to save for their own old age, or the
country as a whole to save for the period when there will be a high level of old-age
dependency. Although this would have little eﬀect on the steady state of the model, it
would signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the model’s dynamics. As discussed in Cutler et al. (1990)
and Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000), the ability of the economy as a whole to insulate itself
against demographic shocks by building extra capital is limited by both depreciation and
capital’s declining marginal product. Attempts to smooth consumption in the face of
demographic shocks may also result in a run-up of price of capital assets when everyone
is trying to save and a corresponding asset meltdown when everyone is trying to dis-
save.20
We suspect that the extensions discusseda b o v ew o u l dn o ta l t e rt h ef u n d a m e n t a l
predictions of our model, which are relatively grim. Demographers have been wrestling
for decades with explaining below-replacement fertility in some of the world’s richest
countries. Low fertility is viewed as a troubling outcome in and of itself. The failure
of a country’s citizens to replace themselves is cited as evidence of some sort of social
illness. Ironically, this hand-wringing has taken place during a period when the economic
consequences of low fertility were positive. Our results suggest that over the next several
decades, as the eﬀect of low fertility on consumption possibilities turns from positive to
negative, there will be a further reduction in fertility, which will, in the long run, produce
20See Abel (2003) and Lim and Weil (2003).
31further reductions in consumption.
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